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Unfair exemption clauses: An economic analysisl
PROF HEIN K01Z

Economics is not my field. All I can boast of is that, as a lawyer and interested
outsider, I have for a number of years followed the development of a new approach to the
law that is now commonly called "economic analysis of law". It is an approach based on
the conviction that it makes sense to ask whether legal rules can be better understood and
explained, and perhaps improved, if one assumes that they are, or ought to be, designed to
promote the economic goal of efficiency in terms of improving the allocation of scarce
resources. Economic utilitarianism underlying this approach is nowadays criticized by
many as, in the words of Dworkin,2 "unjust in its consequences, because it perpetuates
poverty as a means to efficiency, and deficient in its theory of human nature, because it
sees individuals as self-interested atoms of society, rather than as inherently social beings
whose sense of community is an essential part of their sense of self'.
This may well be so. Unfortunately, however, legal theory is not my field either, and
I hope therefore that you will suffer for a few minutes the more pedestrian view I would
like to adopt. i.e. that the best test of a theory is its utility in predicting or explaining
reality. In order to lay a basis for a discussion on this level I would like to demonstrate
the modus operandi and perhaps the usefulness of the new approach by way of a practical
example.
1. With the rise of the consumer movement in the early seventies most European
countries enacted legislation conferring upon the court a power to invalida~e contract
terms found to be "unfair", "unconscionable", "inequitable" or "unreasonable". Section 36
of the Swedish Contracts Act as amended in 1976 is a typical example. It provides that
the judge may set aside or modify a contract term if he finds it unfair having regard to the
contents of the contract, the circumstances at the time of making the contract, later events
and other circumstances. Similar rules have been enacted in Denmark, Norway, Austria,
West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Some of the
statutes are applicable only where the unfair contract term forms part of a standard-form
contract. Even where this is not so, experience shows that most, if not all, terms found to
be unreasonable by the courts were "standardized", in the sense that they formed part of a
ready-made "pre-fabricated" contract form drawn up by one party for a large number of
contracts. There are two questions I would like to analyze from the economic point of
view:
Firstly,
OOl:ribed?

is there an economic justification

for legislative

measures

of the type

Secondly, is it possible to develop economic criteria for determining whether a given
standard-form clause is "unconscionable" or "unreasonable"?
1.

2.

This is the texl of the talk I had the honour and pleasure of presenting to a seminar at the Uppsala Law
Faculty on March 23, 1987. I wish to express my appreciation to Professors Anders Agell and Torgny
Hastad for their kindness in arranging the talk. Footnotes have been kept to an absolute minimum,
and I have :lot auempted to convert a talk into an article.
Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977) X.
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2. As to the first question, there is no doubt that the justification for the statutes
which are of interest here is generally seen in the inequality of bargaining power of the
parties. According to traditional wisdom, standard contracts are typically used by
enterprises with strong bargaining power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or
services, is frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms, either because the
author of the standard contract has a monopoly or because all competitors use the same
standards terms. For this reason, so the argument runs, the party's contractual intention is
but a subjection, more or less voluntary, to terms dictated by the stronger party,! and the
overall result is that standard contracts in the words of Kessler, "could thus become
effective instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords
enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their own making upon a vast host of
vassalS".2
There may indeed be little doubt that standardized contracts are omnipresent today in
the field both of consumer and business transactions, and it is hardly an overstatement to
say, as one writer has put it, that "agreements in which the terms are actually negotiated
by the parties now belong to the past".3 On the other hand, if inequality of bargaining
power were really the sole raison d'etre for standardized contracts, such inequality would
have to be equally omnipresent in all areas of economic activity, and that is a statement I
find hard to accept. It would also follow from the traditional explanation that contract
terms proposed by one party would always be cut down to size by individual negotiation
provided that the proponent operates in a highly competitive market or the bargaining
power of both sides is roughly equal on other grounds. The available evidence points the
other way. There are many cases in which clearly unfair standard terms have been accepted
by a party whose bargaining power was equal or even superior to that of the other side,
and there is no doubt that standardized contracts dominate even in branches of industry
where there exists fierce competition. Even in these situations, prefabricated terms are
accepted without discussion, not because a powerful capitalist has forced them down the
throat of an unwary or helpless customer but because it simply does not make sense,
economically speaking, for the customer to waste time and energy on a process of
negotiation or of shopping around for better terms. If somebody parks his car or has his
clothes dry-cleaned, he will of course neither discuss the other sides' exemption clause nor
shop around for better terms. But this is so, not because the other side is a "powerful
industrial or commercial overlord", but simply because the cost of shifting the risk back
to the other side is much greater than the potential harm multiplied by the probability
that harm will occur at all. I do not contest that standard-form contracts are often proposed
by parties whose market position has monopolistic characteristics. But I think that the
basiC reason why individual negotiating over standard terms is so rare is that the
"transactioncosts",
i.e. the costs of shopping around for better terms and of customtailoring each transaction are prohibitive.
What, then, is· the economic justification for this type of legislation? In general, of
course, economists favour freedom of contract since contract is the most important
mechanism by which scare resources can be moved to what are considered the most
valuable uses. But economists have always conceded that freedom of contract can only
lead to the desired result of maximizing the net satisfacations in a given society if certain
conditions are satisfied. One of these conditions is that the contracting parties are rational

1.
2.
3.

Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 Co!. L. Rev. 629
(1943) at p. 632.
Kessler (preceding note), at p. 640. See also, in a similar vein Lord Denning's statement in George
Mitchell v Finney Lock. Seeds [1983] Q.B. 284 (C.A.), at p. 297.
DeUlch, Unfair Contracts, The Doctrine of Unconscionability (1977) 1.
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in the sense that they know what they are doing and what best serves their interest For
this reason there is a clear economic justification for a rule under which contracts are void
if made by minors or if induced by fraud, undue influence or duress. Another condition is
the absence of monopolies or overwhelming bargaining power, and it is for this reason
that economists have no objections in principle against statutes seeking to outlaw
agreements in restraint of trade, to lower barriers to market entry, or to subject mergers to
some sort of governmental control. A further condition is the absence of prohibitive
transaction costs. Free contractual exchange can lead to the desired results only where
negotiations are, economically speaking, feasible. Where this is not so a party will
swallow almost anything offered by the other side, not because the other side is a
monopolist but because the cost of negotiating exceeds the benefits to be obtained
through the negotiating process. This is exactly the situation of a party confronted with a
comprehensive set of ready-made standard-form clauses proposed by the other side. Of
course, a statute that allows judicial control of such clauses interferes with freedom of
contract. Yet this is economically justifiable because what the statute seeks to do is to
correct market failure occasioned by prohibitive transaction costs}
3. From this analysis we learn how to proceed to answer the second question, in
other words, to identify criteria for invalidating exemption clauses which are more precise
and more specific than the well-meant, if trivial formulae used by the legislature, such as
"uncoriscionable", "unreasonable", "unfair" and so on. We must ask the question: What
rule would the parties have agreed upon had the transactions cost been zero? In other
words "How would the parties have allocated the contractual risk in question if they had
lived in an ideal world in which all the information required for a rational solution of this
problem haq been available to them at no cost? If we have an answer to .this hypothetical
question we then compare it to the contract term in the real world. If there is a difference
we call the term "unconscionable", if only to please the lawyers, and strike it down as
invalid.
Let us speculate for a moment how parties would allocate contractual risks in the
ideal world. Let. us assume that a buyer and a seller are about to enter into a contract for
the sale of an explosive chemical at a tentative price of 1000. There is one point on
'Which there is not yet an agreement, and that is the question who should bear the risk of
an accidental explosion of the chemical. In an ideal world each party would determine with
great care what the expense of avoiding the risk of explosion would be. Suppose that the
seller came to the conclusion that it would cost him 100 to take safety measures that
eliminate the risk. In that event he would be willing to bear the risk if the buyer agreed to
pay 1100. This offer would be accepted by the buyer if the safety measures he might take
to eliminate the risk cost him more than 100. If the cost to him is only 80 he would not
accept the offer. He would assume the risk himself and pay only 1000. True, the overall
cost to him would be 1080. But he would still be better off than if the risk has been
borne by the seller since in that case the contract price would have been 1100. It is
remarkable that this method of allocating the risk does not only maximize the private
advantage of the parties but serves also the overall interest of society. From a general
point of ,view, we must be interested in assigning the risk to the party who is able to
eliminate it at lower expense than the other party. On a fIrst level, we therefore reach the
conclusion that a contractual risk of a certain description will in the ideal world be
assumed by the party who is able, at lower cost than the other party, to prevent it from
1.

Cf the more detailed analysis of the problem by Adams, Okonomische Analyse des Gesetzes zur
Regelu.ng des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen, in: Anspruche, Eigentums-und
Verfugungsrechte, Schriften des Verens, fur Socialpolitik (Hrsg. HeumaM 1983),655 ff. Schafer/Otl,
Lehrbuch der okonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts (1986) 323ff.; Behrens, Die okonomischen
Grundlagen des Rechts (1986) 155 ff., in particular 170-172.
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materializing.
We must now refine this analysis a little further. You will remember that it was in
my example at a cost of 80 that the buyer was able to eliminate the explosion risk. This
investment makes sense only if the expected cost of the risky event amounts to more than
80. What happens if this cost is no more than 20? Suppose that in the event of an
explosion damages of 20,000 will result, and that the probability of an explosion is
1: 1000. In this case the cost of the risk amounts to 20,000 multiplied by 1/1000 which
is equal to 20. In this situation, the buyer would not invest 80 in safety measures because
no reasonable person would sacrifice 80 in order to save 20. In short, there may exist
risks that will not be avoided because the avoidance cost exceeds the avoidance benefits.
A similar situation arises where avoidance is not only very costly but totally impossible.
In both situations the parties are facing a risk that neither party will prevent because risk
prevention would either be wasteful or impossible. How will these risks be allocated in
an ideal world? To find the answer it is necessary to understand the fundamental concept of
risk aversion. Compare a 1000 per cent chance of having to pay 10 with a 1 per cent
chance of having to pay 1000. Although the expected cost is the same in both cases most
people will prefer the first alternative. They will prefer a certain cost of 10 to the risk of
having to pay 1000 if the probability that the risk will materialize is 1/100. In other
words, they will insure, and the omnipresence of insurance is powerful evidence that risk
.aversion is extremely common. Now let us go back to our case. The parties are facing a
risk that neither party is willing or able to prevent. In this case both parties will want to
insure. Therefore, each party will determine what his expense of insuring against the risk
would be. In the final result, the risk will be assumed by the party who is able, at lower
cost than the other party, to buy insurance coverage. The provisional conclusion is
therefore this: In an ideal world, contractual risks will be assigned to the party who is
able, at lower cost than the other party, to eliminate the risk by taking preventive
measures. If no such measures will be taken either because the risk is unavoidable for the
avoidance cost exceeds the avoidance benefits the risk will be accepted by the party who is
able, at lower cost than the other party, to cover it by insurance.
4. The proof of the pudding lies in the eating, and the true test of a theory lies in its
utility in predicting or explaining reality. The reality I propose to use as a testing ground
for the theory are two cases decided by the German Federal Court of Justice. In both cases
a shipowner had agreed to carry a cargo to a certain port. In both cases the shipper sued
the shipowner for damages to the cargo caused by the negligence of the shipowner or his
crew. In both cases the shipowner based his defence on an exemption clause. In both cases
the decision depended on the validity of the clause.
In the first case sheet metal had been damaged because the hatch-covers had been
leaky, and seawater had during the voyage penetrated into the hold. In other words: the
ship had at the time when it was placed at the shipper's disposal been unfit for the
transportation of sheet metal. I have no doubt that the risk of the ship's initial lack of
fitness would in an ideal world have been assumed by the shipowner. It is he who is
familiar with his ship's condition and with the risks to which a cargo of sheet metal is
exposed if the hatch-covers are not watertight. He also knows the various safety measures
to protect the cargo, and he can easily select'the least expensive measures. The shipper,
on the other hand, knows nothing about the ship's condition. Even if he obtained the
relevant information at considerable cost he would not be in a position to take the
appropriate measures since he has no power to accomplish anything on board another
person's ship. For this reason, it is clearly the shipowner who is able, at lower cost than
the shipper, to eliminate the risk of the ship's unfitness to carry the agreed cargo. It
follows that this risk would in the ideal world have been assumed by the shipowner. The
exemption clause, by assigning the risk to the shipper, deviates from the risk allocation
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that the parties would have agreed upon had the transaction cost been zero. Accordingly,
the exemption clause must be invalidated, and this is indeed the result reached by the
German Federal Court of Justice.\
In the second case a cargo of salt had been damaged because owning to the crew's
negligence the ship had during its voyage collided with a pier, and water had trickled into
the hold. How would the risk of a negligent failure by the crew to use reasonable care in
handling the ship during its voyage be allocated in the ideal world? The shipper can of
course do nothing to eliminate this risk. How about the shipowner? After all, he is the
employer of his crew. He is in a position to select the most competent people, to train
them and fire them if they appear to be incompetent. On the other hand, we must not
overestimate the shipowner's possibilities to eliminate blunders and mistakes of his crew.
In selecting the captain, the officers and the crew a shipowner will of course ensure that
they hold the necessary certificates, have stayed clear of the criminal law, have done a
satisfactory job in their prior employments, and are not too fond of the bottle. He will do
all this anyway if only because he wants to protect his ship (rather than the cargo). What
else can a shipowner do to weed out applicants who are more likely than others to
commit the occasional mistake? Such mistakes are, as we all know, inevitable and this
means, unavoidable. Arguably, no clear decision can therefore be made on the first level
because the risk is more or less unavoidable for both parties.
We must therefore move to the second level and ask, which party is able, at lower
cost than the other party, to provide insurance coverage? It would seem that this risk is
more easily and more cheaply insured by the shipper. He has full information on the
cargo, on its value and on the consequential damages that might result from its loss. He
is therefore in a better position than the shipowner to buy custom-tailored transport
insurance protection. True, the shipowner might buy liability insurance. But 'this is likely
to be more expensive. Fixing the maximum coverage of the policy would be difficult
since the shipowner knows little about the value of the cargo and about his potential
liability. The liability insurer's duty to pay depends on the liability of the insured. This is
as a rule more costly to determine than loss or damage to the cargo which suffices to
trigger a transport insurer's duty to pay. Liability insurance would nbt cover loss or
damage to the cargo if caused by force majeure or act of God. Since this risk would have
to be covered by the shipper, wasteful double insurance might follow. There is therefore
evidence to show that it is less costly for the shipper to provide insurance coverage. The
parties would therefore in an ideal world have agreed to shift the risk to the shipper. Since
this is exactly what the exemption clause amounts to it should be allowed to stand, and
the shipper's damages action should be dismissed. This is the result reached by the Federal
Court of Justice.2

1.
2.

Entsheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen, Vol. 49, 356; cr. also B~desgerichtshofs,
Neue Iuristische Wochensrhift 1973, 1878,
Bundesgerichtshof, Neue Iuristische Wochenschrift 1973, 2107.

